In this issue:
Our Autumn 2010 issue has cartels as its primary focus. Doug Ginsburg & Josh Wright argue for increasing punishment to the business people who participate in these price-fixing schemes. Competition authority heads Pieter Kalbfleisch and Mariana Tavares react as do economist Joe Harrington and lawyer Don Klawiter. Continuing the cartel theme are four papers on various historical and economic aspects of cartel enforcement by renowned economists John Connor, Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, and Elisa Mariscal & Carlos Mena-Labarthe.
The next two pieces turn to China. Michael Jacobs & Xinzhu Zhang compare the Chinese approach to IP licensing with U.S. and EU laws. For our case study, Drs. Ian McEwin & Corinne Chew examine a Chinese Court decision on the Baidu abuse of dominance claim. We end with Dennis Carlton & Sam Peltzman introducing a a reprint of George Stigler’s enormously influential A Theory of Oligopoly.
To download the entire issue as a single PDF, see the link at the bottom of this column.
-
From the Editor
Letter From the Editor
We extend our thanks to this excellent set of contributors for an insightful collection of articles. David S. Evans (Editor-in-Chief)
-
Colloquium: Who Should Be the Target of Cartel Sanctions?
Antitrust Sanctions
Corporate executives will not be deterred as long as consumers and shareholders bear the brunt of antitrust penalties. Douglas Ginsburg (U.S. Court of Appeals) & Joshua Wright (George Mason Univ.)
Comment on Antitrust Sanctions
Cartel activity remains high which means that we should push forward on as many fronts as economists and lawyers can dream up. Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins)
Antitrust Oversight: More an Art than a Craft
The NMa in recent years has battled violators of the Dutch Competition Act in order to get rid of the Netherlands reputation of cartel paradise. Pieter Kalbfleish (Netherlands Competition Authority)
Improving Deterrence of Hard-Core Cartels
Holding perpetrators accountable and tailoring the optimal mix of sanctions through a combination of administrative and criminal penalties are two core elements of Brazil’s anti-cartel enforcement. Mariana Tavares de Araujo (SDE, Brazil)
Antitrust Criminal Sanctions: The Evolution of Executive Punishment
The increased focus on the defendant executive raises a number of problems that will keep company counsel, as well as targeted executives and their independent counsel, awake at night. Donald Klawiter (Sheppard Mullin)
-
A Symposium on Cartel Sanctions
Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990-2009
High rates of or rising trends in recidivism is evidence that enforcement of a criminal law is failing. John Connor (Purdue Univ.)
Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple Applications
Screens are not only useful to antitrust agencies; they can also be powerful tools for plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust cases. Rosa Abrantes-Metz (LECG) & Patrick Bajari (Univ. of Minnesota)
Constant Vigilance: Maintaining Cartel Deterrence During the Great Recession
We need to assure that any implementation of an inability to pay policy has specific, objective, and transparent criteria. Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow (Univ. of Michigan)
Leniency Programs in Latin America: New Tools for Cartel Enforcement
We should focus our efforts to increasing our effectiveness in fighting cartels, a historic and generalized anticompetitive behavior that has plagued our economies. Elisa Mariscal & Carlos Mena-Labarthe (Federal Competition Commission of Mexico)
-
China: Intellectual Property
China’s Approach to Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Under Its Anti-Monopoly Law
Antitrust laws differ in their approaches to compulsory licensing not because they subscribe to different schools of economic thought, but because the different political and cultural beliefs that inform and animate them lead inevitably to different answers. Michael Jacobs (DePaul Univ.) & Xinzhu Zhang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences).
-
Notable Antitrust Cases
China”The Baidu Decision
The challenge for the courts will be in surmounting the limited access to economic expertise in newly developing, high-technology markets where the costs of making wrong decisions can be considerable. Dr. Ian McEwin (Nat’l Univ. of Singapore) & Dr. Corinne Chew (Rajah & Tann)
-
The Classics
Introduction to Stigler’s Theory of Oligopoly
Stigler’s theory of oligopoly remains a central pillar in merger policy in most, if not all, antitrust regimes around the world. Dennis Carlton & Sam Peltzman (Univ. of Chicago)
Theory of Oligopoly
Our modification of this theory consists simply in presenting a systematic account of the factors governing the feasibility of collusion, which like most things in this world is not free. (George Stigler)
-
CPI Autumn 2010 eBook
