Tag: Cartels

Posted by Social Science Research Network Collusion: Is it Really that Bad? By Adriaan Ten Kate Sr. Abstract:     Collusion, particularly collusion is in the form of...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Regarding the Optimality of Cartel Fines By Bruce H. Kobayashi (George Mason University) & Michelle Burtis (Charles River Associates) Abstract:  ...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Cartels Costly for Customers By John M. Connor (American Antitrust Institute) Abstract:     This paper describes some major trends in cartelization...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Penalizing on the Basis of the Severity of the Offence: A Sophisticated Revenue-Based Cartel Penalty By Yannis Katsoulacos (Athens University),...

Posted by Social Science Research Network The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Quantitative Review of the Commission Decisions between 2000 and 2017 By Damien Geradin...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Rationale and Benefits of Leniency Programs Under EU Competition Law and US Federal Anti-Trust Law By Basil Siddique (Federal Board...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Of Course Collusion Should Be Prosecuted. But Maybe... Or (the Case for International Antitrust Agreements) By Filomena Garcia, Jose Manuel...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Citizen Fox: The global antitrust vision of Eleanor Fox By Philip Marsden (College of Europe) & Spencer Weber Waller (Loyola...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Margin Squeeze - Where Competition Law and Sector Regulation Compete By Friso Bostoen (KU Leuven) Abstract:     This paper discusses abusive...

Posted by Social Science Research Network Pleading, Discovering, and Proving a Sherman Act Agreement: Harmonizing Twombly and Matsushita By William H. Page (University of Florida) Abstract:  ...