Platform Market Definition in EU Antitrust Law: The Case of Android

In April 2020, the European Commission launched the review of the Market Definition Notice (MDN), which had remained unaltered since its adoption in 1997. Among the novelties in the revised “Draft MDN” as published in November 2022 is additional guidance in relation to market definition in digital markets, such as multi-sided markets, aftermarkets, and digital eco-systems. This guidance builds on the significant experience built in the last two decades both in the realm of merger control and in antitrust enforcement. The recent General Court judgment on the European Commission’s 2018 Android decision is therefore a welcome and timely addition to the Courts’ guidance on platform market definition, notably in the context of an antitrust case, and nicely illustrates a number of key issues laid out in the revised draft MDN. This article revisits the main pillars of the Commission’s market definition in Android, and analyses the principles underlying the Commission’s approach in this case, thus addressing many of the recurring challenges encountered by authorities everywhere in dealing with defining markets in these complex environments.

By Liliane Giardino-Karlinger & Rossitza Kotzeva^[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

From payment systems to computer operating systems, search engines, app stores and online marketplaces, competition authorities have been increasingly dealing with companies operating platform business models. While not new – indeed, stock exchanges an