In this issue:
This issue, organized by guest editor Glen Weyl, concerns one of the hottest topics in antitrust and economics—two-sided markets. Understanding the distinction between conventional and two-sided markets is a necessary challenge for practitioners, corporate executives, and regulators alike; our writers investigate some of these differences. Lapo Filistrucchi questions how many markets are, in fact, two-sided, while Joshua Gans focuses in on price signals. Renato Gomes looks at sponsored search auctions and Hanna HaÅ‚aburda & MikoÅ‚aj Jan Piskorski ask when a platform should give people fewer choices—but charge more. Shanker Singham & Kaushal Sharma bring an international and regulatory perspective while Pai-Ling Yin contrasts membership and usage. Enjoy!
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Two-Sided Markets
How Many Markets are Two-Sided?
Once one accepts that two-sided markets are different, one wonders whether competition authorities have, so far, been doing everything wrong. Lapo Filistrucchi, Tilburg Univ. & Univ. of Florence
Price Signals in Two-Sided Markets
A seeming lack of price competition to one set of consumers may mask competition for another, related set of consumers. Joshua Gans, University of Melbourne
Sponsored Search Auctions: Simple Economics and Implications for Antitrust Policy
Surprisingly, concentrated markets can be welfare-improving when search engines are not able to subsidize (or charge) searchers for their clicking behavior. Renato Gomes, Toulouse School of Economics
When Should a Platform Give People Fewer Choices and Charge More for Them?
How can some platforms offer less choice and yet charge more to participate? Hanna Hałaburda & Mikołaj Jan Piskorski, Harvard Business School
Maximizing Competition in the Case of Two-Sided Markets
The differences between traditional markets and two-sided markets need to be understood as much by regulators as those operating in the markets.Shanker Singham & Kaushal Sharma, Squire Sanders & Dempsey and Competition Commission of India
A Tale of Two Games: Membership Versus Usage in Platform Competition
The distinction between membership demand and demand for usage in platform competition is often ignored. Estelle Cantillon ECARES, Universite Libr de Bruxelles & Pai-Ling Yin, Sloan School of Management at MIT
