In this issue:
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Withdrawal Symptoms: The Status of Section 2
Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization
The handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,†“single-firm conduct,†or “abuse of dominance†continues to be debated by the competition policy community.
The Brief Life of the Section 2 Report and the Uncertain Future of Bundled Discounts
Despite the current rapprochement between the FTC and Antitrust Division, the skirmishing over the report left a sour taste in many mouths and may have been detrimental to the collective influence of the antitrust agencies
The Error Cost Approach to Section 2 Legal Standards
It is also an effort to reverse or set aside the adopted lessons of the error cost approach.
Are Administrable Bright Line Rules Underutilized in Section 2 Analyses?
The widespread use of the rule of reason can be problematic, however, because of the inability of antitrust agencies and courts to reliably differentiate between pro- and anticompetitive conduct.
The New (Or is it Old?) Approach to Antitrust Regulation
The Section 2 Report envisions predictable, principled, and coherent enforcement. That’s a noble, if tough to achieve vision, but it is one that has little chance of materializing if antitrust embraces a whole set of conflicting concerns.
Identifying and Remedying Exclusionary Conduct: Microsoft, the DOJ Section 2 Report, and the New Administration
I will comment on two subsidiary but nonetheless critical subjects that the DOJ addressed in the Report: general (as opposed to practice-specific) standards of exclusion and affirmative-obligation (as opposed to prohibitory) remedies.
A Short History of the DOJ Section 2 Report
Given the embarrassing outcome of the Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice (“FTC/DOJâ€) single-firm conduct hearings, it is worth revisiting why the agencies held the hearings and what they were trying to accomplish.
The State of Single-Firm Conduct Policy
While it was clear that the Administration would not let the Report stand, what remains unclear is what exactly is the single-firm conduct policy of the United States and with respect to that policy what it will advocate internationally.
An Evidence-Based Approach to Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Discounts
A sensible consensus view emerged that a necessary condition for anticompetitive harm in an exclusive dealing or de facto exclusive contract is that the contract deprives rivals of the opportunity to compete.
