Before we get back into the hectic fall season, we wanted to catch up with some competition authorities—especially looking at how they’ve faced difficult challenges involving new legislation, new structures, and new authority. So join us as we check in on China, India, Brazil, Mexico, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and last—but certainly not least—Poland (where they decided the prison sauerkraut case—the single best case name we’ve heard in a long time). And enjoy what’s left of the summer!
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New Challenges for Authorities
Merger Remedies with Chinese Characteristics
MOFCOM’s seemingly heavier reliance on behavioral remedies could be due in part to the unique aspects of China’s transitional phase from planned economy to market economy. Elizabeth Xiao-Ru Wang (CRAI), Joanna Tsai (U.S. FTC), & Sandra Chan (CRAI)
Merger Control in India: A Century of Merger Notifications
The CCI now has its own experience of more than 100 cases to rely upon and learn from. Cyril Shroff & Nisha Kaur Uberoi (Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A. Shroff & Co)
One Year After: Premerger Notification Unit in Brazil
A swift and efficient response from the new CADE was necessary to calm the general agitation and, ultimately, neutralize the feeling of insecurity that reigned over the new Brazilian antitrust model, especially in merger review. Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo & M¡rio Srgio Rocha Gordilho Jr. (CADE)
The June 2013 Landmark Constitutional Amendments to Competition and Telecom Law in Mexico
The drafting of this bill was done in secrecy to avoid outside influences from major players in the telecom industry. Omar Guerrero Rodriguez & Alan Ramirez Casazza (Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Landa, S.C)
National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement
What are the differences in term of resources, independence, and enforcement among the competition authorities in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom? Pierre-Andre Buigues (Toulouse University) & Roderick Meiklejohn
Separate Economic Rationale in Certain Bid-Rigging Schemes Involving Offer Withdrawal A Critique of Polish Bid-Rigging Cases
If entrepreneurs who are parties to an alleged anticompetitive agreement don’t have “independent economic justification or independent economic motivation for their conduct, such conduct does not qualify as an agreement under most competition law regimes. Piotr Semeniuk
