Dear Readers,
This edition of the Chronicle looks at recent developments in the antitrust analysis of vertical agreements in jurisdictions around the world. It is accepted in most jurisdictions that vertical agreements (i.e., agreements between parties that occupy different places in the supply chain) are less likely to raise antitrust concerns than horizontal agreements. Nonetheless, they still occasionally raise concerns, and tend to be analyzed under specific rules and regulations adopted under the underlying competition rules in each jurisdiction. Recent developments in online platform markets have rendered even more complex the application of well=honed principles concerning vertical agreements, which tend to raise novel concerns.
Alison Jones & Karen Slaney open by looking at the implications of new vertical systems in the EU and the UK. In 2022, both the EU and the UK reviewed and overhauled their regimes governing vertical agreements. The reform processes were provoked by the expiry in May 2022 of Regulation 330/2010, which block exempted many vertical agreements from Article 101(1) TFEU in the EU and, through the retention of the EU block exemption as part of UK law following Brexit, from the Chapter I prohibition set out in the Competition Act 1998 in the UK. The paper also highlights the post-2022 divergences between the EU and UK rules, and the implications they raise for those distributing their goods or services in both the EU and the UK.
Charlotte Colin-Dubuisson & Sima Ostrovsky and Kassiani Christodoulou & Marion Carbo take up the baton by further analyzing the new EU regime. Ensuring that hardcore restrictions are defined with sufficient clarity is key to the effectiveness of the rules. Following the adoption of the new VBER in May 2022, this article focuses on the changes made to the provisions concerning hardcore restrictions and the additional guidance provided in the accompanying Vertical Guidelines.
Turning to South America, and Brazil specifically, João Felipe Achcar de Azambuja underlines how antitrust enforcement in digital markets requires a cautious approach, yet their fast-changing nature also calls for quick responses. In certain circumstances, interim measures may serve as tools to enable some level of preliminary intervention before it is too late, but could be especially challenging when imposed on digital platforms without in-depth market knowledge. This paper discusses the role of interim measures applied to digital platform exclusivity cases in the context of the recent Brazilian experience with the iFood and Gympass probes
As always, many thanks to our great panel of authors.
Sincerely,
CPI Team
