Our issue this month, organized by Rosa Abrantes-Metz, brings together antitrust theory and practice. We look at the econometric approach of screening as a way to identify possible cartels and other collusive activities, analyzing how to apply screens both from the regulators’ and the potential defendants’ perspectives. The analysis is illustrated with real-life applications to the LIBOR market, bid-rigging in Mexico, and price-fixing in Brazil. We conclude with a special interest article giving an indepth comparison of the U.S. and European approaches to quantifying antitrust damages.
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Using Screens Effectively
How Far Can Screens Go in Distinguishing Explicit from Tacit Collusion? New Evidence on the Libor Setting
We explore, in the context of the Libor, whether screens can move one step further and distinguish illegal (explicit) from legal (tacit) collusion. Rosa Abrantes-Metz (Global Economics Group) & Albert Metz (Moody’s Investor Services)
Conspiracy Screens: Practical Defense Perspectives
Screens can rationally determine critical points in a possible cartel, including the duration, breadth, and success of a conspiracy…Donald C. Klawiter (Sheppard Mullin)
Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging
As experience has proved, screens have flagged unusual patterns in a variety of countries and industries, and helped in the detection of cartels. Carlos Mena-Labarthe (Mexican Federal Competition Commission)
Screens in the Gas Retail Market: The Brazilian Experience
It is not an overstatement to say that the use of screens in the gas retail market was a success. Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo (CADE, Brazil)
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Of Special Interest
Quantifying Antitrust Damages Convergence of Methods Recognized by U.S. Courts and the European Commission
The methods recognized by U.S. courts and the European Commission underlying the procedural and quantitative tools and techniques for quantifying antitrust damages have more similarities than differences. Claire M. Korenblit (Sidley Austin)
