By: Pablo Ibañez Colomo (Chilling Competition)
The General Court’s judgment in Google Shopping (available here) is finally out. There is much to unpack, and much that will be debated in the coming days and weeks. In this regard: the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice is planning a Special Issue devoted to the judgment. More details will follow in due course, but we will be open to proposed submissions, as we want to make sure that the issue is as balanced and diverse as possible.
The above said, it is immediately possible to get a clear idea of the logic underpinning the judgment. It is remarkable in a number of ways, which, if appealed and confirmed by the Court of Justice, may lead to a substantial expansion of the scope of Article 102 TFEU.
The rationale behind the judgment can be summarised as follows:
- The General Court’s develops a principle of equal treatment, which is inferred from the case law applicable to public undertakings (and public bodies) and is now expanded to other dominant firms (para 155).
- There is an element of ‘abnormality’ in the differential treatment of a search engine’s affiliated services, on the one hand, and third party ones, on the other (paras 176, 179 and 616).
- Google’s search engine is a ‘quasi-essential facility’; in any event, it is not necessary to establish that the platform is indispensable within the meaning of the Bronner case law.
Equal treatment, abnormality and competition on the merits
When reading the judgment, one cannot avoid the impression that the General Court viewed the practice at stake in the case as inherently suspicious, that is, as a departure, by its very nature, from competition on the merits. To quote the judgment itself: ‘the promotion on Google’s general results pages of one type of specialised result – its own – over the specialised results of competitors involves a certain form of abnormality‘ (para 176).
The judgment concludes that the behaviour at stake is ‘abnormal’ for two separate reasons…
